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Financial Analysis

Fraudulent Financial Information

By Nawshad Khadaroo, CCP

Often, the depth and breadth of a credit analysis is based on the risk associated with a potential or existing customer.  For example, when the risk is considered low, a simple trade reference check might suffice whereas in cases where the stakes are high, many seasoned and trained credit managers will resort to financial statement analysis.  Aside from the challenge of getting your customers to furnish financial statements, determining the reliability of such documents can prove to be quite tricky.  Even in instances when the financials are audited by renowned auditing firms as in the Enron/Arthur Andersen case, the numbers can be deceiving.  So, what red flags should credit professionals be on the look out for when analyzing financial information from their customers?  This article is intended to introduce the readers to a new approach suggested by Professor Messod D. Beneish from the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University in order to flag areas of potential fraudulent manipulation when analyzing financial statements. 

Fraudulent Financial Information

Financial statement frauds can have many victims and one of them is the supplier of goods or services on credit.  For the credit professionals, this can translate into serious consequences.  Just imagine the bad debt loss that can result in making a credit-granting decision based on fraudulent financial information furnished by a company.  To further illustrate this, consider the following example:  for a company that has a profit margin of 2%, to recoup $100K suffered through bad debt, it would need to make additional sales of $5 million.  This does not include the expenses that the company would have to incur to generate the necessary sales volume to recover the loss.

Many credit professionals are familiar with and perform the standard ratio analysis in order to determine the solvency, efficiency and profitability of a company.  While this is an important part of financial statement analysis, they should, however, not stop there.  In fact, when assessing the credit worthiness of a customer, they should go one step further by asking themselves whether the financial information under their review stands the test of one of the key principles of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), namely: reliability.   

Giving new meanings to financial ratios

After analyzing and comparing data from 2,406 companies, Professor Messod D. Beneish has developed a predictive model to demonstrate how “some accounting variables can be used to identify companies that are manipulating their reported earnings.”  Following are the 8 variables that he used in the model to determine whether a company has manipulated its earnings or not.  This is a summarized version adapted from the paper “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation" published in the Financial Analysts Journal, 1999, 55(5): 24-36], by MD Beneish.

Note: t = current year & t – 1 = prior year LTD = long term debt; PP&E = property, plant & equipment

Days’ sales in receivables index:

DSRI = Receivablest / Salest
               Receivablest-1 / Salest-1

This variable gauges whether receivables and revenues are in or out of balance in two consecutive years. A large increase in days’ sales in receivables could be the result of a change in credit policy to spur sales in the face of increased competition, but disproportionate increases in receivables relative to sales could also suggest revenue inflation..

Gross margin index:

GMI = (Salest-1 – Cost of goods soldt-1/Salest-1
(Salest – Cost of goods soldt)/Salest

A GMI greater than 1 represents deterioration in gross margins.    

Asset quality index:
AQI = 1 - (Current assetst + PP&E)/Total assetst
         1 - (Current assetst-1 +  PP&Et-1)/Total assetst-1

A greater than 1 AQI infers that the company has potentially increased its involvement in cost deferral.  The AQI index measures the proportion of total assets for which future returns are not certain.    

Sales growth index:
SGI = Salest
         Salest-1

Although sales growth is a desirable occurrence within a company, some professionals are of the opinion that high growth companies are “more likely than other companies to commit financial statement fraud”.

Depreciation index:

DEPI = Depreciationt-1/(Depreciationt-1 + PP&Et-1)
 Depreciationt /(Depreciationt + PP&Et)

A DEPI greater than 1 indicates that the rate at which assets are being depreciated has slowed.  This may imply that the lives of assets have been extended or the company has changed its method of calculating depreciation.  The net effect of decreasing depreciation is inevitably an increase in income when other income statement variables remain constant. 

Sales, general, and administrative expenses index:

SGAI = Sales, general, and administrative expenset/Salest
                Sales, general, and administrative expenset-1 /Salest-1)

A disproportionate relative increase in sales may suggest uncertainties about a company’s future prospects.

Leverage index:

LVGI = (LTDt + Current liabilitiest)/Salest
                (LTDt-1 + Current liabilitiest-1)/Salest-1

An LVGI greater than 1 indicates an increase in leverage.

Total accruals to total assets:

ΔCurrent assetst – ΔCasht – (ΔCurrent liabilitiest                                                                                                                
                    - Δcurrent maturities of LTDt – ΔIncome tax payablet)
                                      – Depreciation and amortizationt
TATA =________________________________________________
Total assets

Total accruals are calculated as the change in working capital accounts other than cash less depreciation.  Positive accruals suggest that there is less cash behind accounting income.

As you will see in the illustration that follows, Pr. Beneish has used the 8 variables described above to show that there existed some distortions in the financials that Enron, Lucent and Sunbeam had filed prior to the discovery of the accounting scandals associated with these companies.   


Illustration of the two types of variables in Beneish’s earnings manipulation detection model "The Detection of Earnings Manipulation" in the Financial Analysts’ Journal, 1999, 55(5): 24-36], by MD Beneish

1. Variables designed to capture financial statement distortions:

Days’ sales in receivables index and Accrual to Total Assets are responsible for flagging Lucent and Sunbeam as potential earnings manipulators.  Days’ sales in receivables index is computed as the ratio of days sales in receivables in two consecutive years.   Absent a change in credit policy to spur sales in the face of increased competition, days sales in receivables in two consecutive years should be the approximately the same and the index variable would have an expected value of one. 

As you can see below, Lucent‘s computation shows an unusual accumulation in receivables, with the latter growing at a rate 17% faster than sales.  Such a disproportionate increase in receivables relative to sales is suggestive of revenue inflation.  A similar pattern appears for Sunbeam when I apply the model to their originally reported data, but the index variable is very close to its expected value of 1, once the firm has been forced to restate their previously inflated revenues.  The variable Accruals to Total Assets also contributes to flagging these firms: positive accruals suggest that there is less cash behind accounting income—on average accruals tend to be negative in the range of -4 to -5%.   

 

Lucent

Sunbeam 1997

Variables

1999

As reported

As restated

Day Sales in Receivables Index

1.170

1.167

0.999

Gross Margin Index

0.976

0.300

0.393

Asset Quality Index

0.960

0.928

0.907

Sales Growth Index

1.204

1.187

1.090

Depreciation  Index

0.952

1.284

1.247

SG&A  Index

1.018

0.516

0.632

Accruals to Total Assets

0.088

0.105

0.042

Leverage Index

0.908

0.795

0.966

 

 

 

 

Model Score

-1.736

-1.884

-2.460

Model Estimated Probability

0.041

0.030

0.007


2. Variables that suggest propitious conditions for the occurrence of manipulation

Two variables contribute to identifying Enron as a potential manipulator as early as 1998 are:  A value greater than 1 for the Gross Margin Index suggests that gross margins have deteriorated, a signal that poorer prospects provides greater incentives to manipulate. A large value for the Sales Growth Index does not imply manipulation, except that manipulators tend to be young, high growth firms. 

 

Enron

Variables

1997

Day Sales in Receivables Index

0.625

Gross Margin Index

1.448

Asset Quality Index

1.308

Sales Growth Index

1.526

Depreciation  Index

1.017

SG&A  Index

0.649

Accruals to Total Assets

0.012

Leverage Index

1.041

 

 

Model Score

-1.890

Model Estimated Probability

0.029

The analysis above received much attention subsequent to the Enron scandal because a group of Cornell MBA students had prepared a report applying various techniques including my model as part of their involvement, in 1998, with a student run fund. 

In order to have a better appreciation of the professor’s work, the readers are encouraged to consult the paper in its totality as published in the Financial Analysts Journal.  A review written by Joseph T. Wells on the professor’s work can also be found at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2001/wells.htm

DISCLAIMER: The enclosed information is of necessity a brief overview and it is not intended that readers should rely wholly on the information contained herein.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: A special thank to Professor Messod D. Beneish for making the illustrations available to benefit the members of the Credit Institute of Canada.

REFERENCES:

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, http://acfe.com

http://www.worrells.net.au/factsheets/Financial_Statement_Fraud.htm

Deloitte Forensic Center, www.deloitte.com/us/forensiccenter

Journal of Accountancy, www.aicpa.org

http://www.bauer.uh.edu/swhisenant/beneish%20earnings%
20mgmt%20score.pdf

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting

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